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TORTS
William E. Crawford*

THE PRESENT STANCE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA

Strict liability appeared on the Louisiana scene in 1975 when the
supreme court announced a new interpretation of Civil Code articles
2317 through 2324 in Turner v. Bucher.' The reliance on French doctrine
which prompted that announcement was made complete and fully articulated in Loescher v. Parr.2 The court in Loescher declared failure
to use reasonable care to no longer be an element of a cause of action
in the broad segment of circumstances covered by these code articles
when an "unreasonable risk of harm" is found.
Preceding the Loescher doctrine somewhat was the doctrine of strict
liability for manufactured products under Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty
Insurance Co. 3 This theory of strict products liability is based on a
finding that the condition of a product made it "unreasonably dangerous
to normal use," which under Weber made the product "defective."
Under Civil Code article 667, strict liability for damage done to
neighboring property is based upon the fact of damage caused by an
ultrahazardous activity, without reference to the defendant's exercise of
care. This provision for strict liability has been a part of Louisiana law
since the Civil Code of 1808. The doctrine differs from Loescher and
Weber since it is based upon the fundamental concept of enterprise
liability, while Loescher and Weber are based upon an allocation of
risk theory, which is perhaps most simply described as the deep-pocket
theory.
Evolution of Loescher
1. UnreasonableRisk of Harm
Liability under Loescher requires, beyond causation, either a vice
or defect in the thing or deficient conduct in the person or animal, and
the defendant's garde of the person, thing, or animal. 4 A vice or defect
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is a condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm.' There may be a
dangerous aspect of the thing, but if it is not unreasonable, then it is
not actionable. 6 A risk is unreasonable when thus characterized under
the balancing process, which is a risk-utility analysis definitively explained
in Entrevia v. Hood,7 and consistent with the balancing process set forth
in the Restatement of Torts" and in the jurisprudence of numerous other
states. 9 The most recent and significant application of the balancing
process is the case of Meyers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. 0 In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court accepted an argument
on behalf of the state that the cost of maintaining all parts of the state
highway system in a modern design would be financially impossible,
thus rendering the risk of that particular road design not "unreasonable."
Should the attorneys at trial be permitted to introduce evidence
relevant to the factors involved in the balancing process, as the state
did in the highway case? For instance, in another falling tree case, such
as Loescher, should the parties be allowed to introduce evidence of the
cost of keeping trees in safe condition? In the same vein, in circumstances
such those as involved in Entrevia, where the allegedly defective thing
was an abandoned farm building, should the parties be allowed to
introduce evidence showing the cost and other economic consequences
that would be encountered if farmers were required to keep all buildings
in habitable, safe condition, regardless of their location on the farm
premises? There are no cases directly addressing this point. It is submitted
that the answer is found by analogy with the requirement for, and
allowance of, expert testimony in a given case.
Expert testimony is required or allowed when an understanding of
a subject matter would not be within the ordinary juror's acumen, as
has long been found in medical malpractice, engineering, and products
liability cases. Thus, an ordinary jury could be presumed to know the
relative expense and difficulty of maintaining trees on residential premises. Depending on the makeup of the particular jury, it might or might
not be familiar with the economics of maintaining outlying farm buildings
in habitable condition. Beyond question, a jury would not be possessed
of the knowledge necessary to determine whether the state had the
financial capacity to fully maintain all roads in a modern design, and
evidence on the balancing process factors should be received.
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2.

Garde

Loescher clearly states that legal responsibility for a defective thing
accompanies the "garde" of the thing. This term is distinguished from
"custody," so that the owner of a thing may have the garde even when
the thing is in the custody of another. This was the case in Sikes v.
McLean Trucking Co.," in which the owner of a car permitted it to
be used by another, with the result that the driver of the car had the
garde, since he had the custody thereof, and the owner also had the
garde, which flowed from his relationship as owner of the car.
The rule is the same with animals, as in Rozell,' 2 in which a syndicate
owner of a bull' turned the animal over to the Louisiana State University
animal department for study. Liability for injury caused by the bull
settled upon the owners even though they very clearly did not have the
custody of the animal.
The very recent Ross 3 case shows that the owner of a defective
stepladder under gratuitous loan to another private individual retained
the garde, which rendered the owner of the ladder liable for the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff when the ladder collapsed.
3. Defenses to Loescher Liability
Although Loescher strict liability is based on a vice or defect in a
thing over which the defendant has garde, there are defenses which the
defendant may assert which will defeat recovery. Loescher itself sets out
liability are victim fault, fault
that the three defenses to Loescher strict
4
of a third party, and force majeure.'
There has been great debate about the type of conduct which will
qualify as victim fault, as seen in Dorry v. Lafleur,5 which held that
ordinary contributory negligence would satisfy the requirement. The
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hyde v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 6 reviewed Dorry and adopted its holding that contributory
negligence does qualify as a victim fault defense to Loescher liability.
A second defense which may allow a defendant to escape Loescher
strict liability is third party fault. Third party fault was definitively
explained in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.,' 7 which held that in order for the
fault of a third party to relieve a primary defendant of liability, the
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fault must be one-hundred percent of the cause of the damage, for then
there could be no causal relationship between the defendant and the
damage at all. It should be noted parenthetically that proof of those
causal relationships would result in exoneration of the primary defendant
whether or not it were captioned "third party fault" because in any
tort suit, the showing of one-hundred percent causation in another person
will afortiorirelieve the primary defendant of liability, since no causation
at all can be attributed to him. This raises the further question of
whether evidence of causation by another party may be introduced even
though third party fault is not pleaded as an affirmative defense. The
evidence should be admissible in rebuttal-contradiction of plaintiff's
allegations of material fact constituting causation.'8
Another defense which may be raised to preclude a finding of strict
liability under Loescher is force majeure or act of God. The defense
of force majeure is illustrated in the case of a tree blown over in a
high wind, which the court classified as force majeure or an act of
God, and which operated to relieve the owner of the tree of liability. 19
One may speculate, although it has not been raised in a case, that if
a basis existed to apportion the cause of the damage between the force
majeure and the primary defendant there would be no exoneration under
the rule of Olsen (i.e., if third party fault is not the sole cause, then
defendant, for that reason, is not exonerated). It would appear that
third party fault and an act of God should be applied in a parallel
fashion, so that the act of God would be required to be one-hundred
percent of the cause of the harm, otherwise the defendant would bear
liability.
4. Comparative Negligence
Numerous cases have applied comparative negligence to Loescher
liability cases involving victim fault in the form of contributory negligence.20 This is an entirely logical application of comparative negligence
which follows from the finding in Dorry that contributory negligence
satisfies victim fault under Civil Code article 2323, since article 2323
applies comparative negligence "when contributory negligence is applicable." It follows that victim fault in the form of contributory negligence
is properly subject to comparative.
Courts have acknowledged since the beginning of the Loescher line
of cases that assumption of risk is a proper defense to Loescher liability.
Indeed, some cases indicate that certain members of the supreme court

18.
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felt that assumption of risk was the only defense qualifying as victim
fault,2 and comparative negligence has been applied to assumption of
risk defenses in some Loescher-type cases. 22
In Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast,23 which was written ostensibly on products
liability, the court dealt in very broad terms with the defense available
in strict products liability and construed the Civil Code provisions broadly
enough so that the language in Bell can easily be interpreted to apply
not only to products cases but to all cases in which comparative fault
might be applicable. The Bell opinion put both negligence and assumption
of risk under the comparative fault principle and it seemed entirely
logical that the holding in Bell would be applicable to Loescher strict
liability as well. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal so found
25
in Aguillard,24 but some doubt has been raised by other opinions. It
seems to this writer that Bell settled the matter and that contributory
negligence and assumption of risk are both subject to the comparative
fault principle, whether in Loescher liability, strict products liability, or
negligence.
Bell also set up what amounts to an ad hoc application of victim
fault. 26 The same ad hoc scheme was adopted for Loescher liability in
Landry v. State.27 Under that scheme, the court, before applying comparative negligence, must determine whether the application of the victim
fault defense in the case before the court will act to deter future victims
from being careless and whether it will deter or encourage future defendants in the creation of dangerous conditions. It appears that the determination of the applicability of contributory negligence should be made
by the court, not the jury, at the outset of trial in order to have
uniformity of the law in that regard, which would not be true if each
jury made the determination anew in every case.
Products Liability
While there were earlier rumblings of the approach of strict products
liability, Louisiana was without a comprehensive scheme until the writing
of Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. 21 in 1971 by the late
Justice Albert Tate. In Weber, the court considered the existing products

21. Hebert v. Maryland Casualty Co., 369 So. 2d 708
in the denial).
22. See Aguillard v. Langlois, 471 So. 2d 1011 (La.
23. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
24. 471 So. 2d at 1015-16.
25. Goutierrez v. R & J Quarterhorse Stables, 509
1987); Brown v. Harlan, 468 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 5th
26. 462 So. 2d at 171-72.
27. 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986).
28. 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 1971).

(La. 1979) (Tate, J., concurring
App. 1st Cir. 1985).

So. 2d 551 (La. App. 3d Cir.
Cir. 1985).
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liability jurisprudence from around the country and adopted a short
definitive statement concluding that such liability is based upon harm
caused by the condition of a product rendering it unreasonably dangerous
to normal use, the condition having existed in the hands of the manufacturer. The Weber opinion clearly put traditional negligence, or failure
29
to use reasonable care, outside the scheme of strict products liability.
The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is ultimately founded upon
the balancing process, which is also the foundation of the Loescher
doctrine, and of the basic notion of negligence itself. While the appellate
courts may take the balancing process apart with a scalpel and evaluate
it with the very finest measuring devices, the term "unreasonably dangerous" can be applied by a lay jury without further explanation, as
is the case in many jurisdictions. The balancing process is brought into
sharpest focus in design cases, where historically the courts have been
reluctant to impose what would result in absolute liability if the manufacturer were not exonerated for having made a reasonable design
choice.
The "normal use" terminology has come to mean any foreseeable
use or misuse.30 If the use is foreseeable, it is within the duty of the
manufacturer to guard against harm from that use when the thing is
in an unreasonably dangerous condition.
There is of course a large difference between the "policy" foreseeability and the foreseeability which arises from actual knowledge. It
should be noted that liability does not follow from foreseeability alone.
Many bizarre misuses or uses of a product are certainly foreseeable,
but it is for the appellate court to determine whether the manufacturer
bears the financial responsibility for those bizarre uses. Typically, if the
court decides that the manufacturer is not to bear the responsibility,
then it would simply be held that the use is not foreseeable.
The terms "misuse" and "abnormal use" must be distinguished.
The term "misuse" evolved in the common-law jurisdictions as a means
of avoiding the prohibition against applying contributory negligence to
action in strict liability. In the noted case of Codling v. Paglia,3' the
court in New York noted that while a finding of contributory negligence
would have defeated the claim, that this defense was doctrinally unattainable in an action based on strict liability. Therefore, the court simply

29. The Weber case is as interesting as a study of evidence and logical inference as
it is for the origins of Louisiana products liability theory. In Weber a farmer's cattle
died after they were treated with defendant's arsenic dip at the hands of the farmer's
sons. The dip was unavailable for chemical analysis and the court concluded that the
most reasonable inference was that since the cattle died with the dip in normal use, the
dip must have been defective.
30. Bloxom v. Bloxom, No. 86-2108, slip op. (La. Sept. 9, 1987).
31. 298 N.E. 2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
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made available the characterization of "misuse" as faulty conduct attributable to the plaintiff and weighing against his claim, and which
would serve the same purpose as contributory negligence. On the other
hand, an abnormal use is one that is not a "normal use" and lies
beyond the scope of the manufacturer's duty.
There are important practical consequences that flow from the correct
classification of "misuse," as opposed to "abnormal use," for not all
defensive responses are affirmative defenses in the proper sense. 32 Properly analyzed, "abnormal use" amounts to a finding of non-defect, or
non-unreasonably dangerous, since it is a use that the manufacturer
simply had no duty to protect against. It is not an affirmative defense,
but simply a rebuttal or contradiction of normal use as an essential
element of plaintiff's prima facie case. But if "misuse" is being applied
as a substitute for contributory negligence, then "misuse" is an affirmative defense, which must be pleaded and proved by the defendants.
Likewise, the affirmative defense of "misuse" does not defeat, but only
diminishes, the plaintiff's claim, whereas a finding of "abnormal use"
would be the complete rebuttal of plaintiff's cause of action and would
result in no recovery by plaintiff whatsoever. With the advent of comparative negligence, the distinction between the terms becomes crucial,
because it makes the difference between the defeat of the plaintiff's
case in its entirety and the mere diminution of his recovery.
Defenses to Strict Products Liability
For fourteen years the Louisiana Supreme Court remained silent
about the proper defenses for strict products liability. Numerous court
of appeal decisions discussed contributory negligence, and on occasion
applied assumption of risk, but not until Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast33 was
the question settled. The Bell opinion converted traditional contributory
negligence into comparative negligence and merged assumption of risk
with it, along with misuse. However, there was an innovation introduced
when the court announced that these defenses would not be applicable
in a case where the effects of applying them would not beneficially
influence the conduct of other consumers in similar circumstances, nor
would they be applied where the absence of liability might encourage
manufacturers to continue turning out unreasonably dangerous products.
As noted above, it seems that in order to have consistency and uniformity
in the law, the question of whether comparative negligence applies in
a given products case is to be determined at the outset by the court,
not by the jury.

32. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1005; see also Keller v. Amedeo, No. 87-0464, slip op.
(La. Sept. 9, 1987).
33. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
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The Halphen Case
In 1986, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 4 outlined the theories of recovery for an action based on
strict products liability. A casual reading of the Halphen opinion would
lead one to say that little has changed since Weber, except for the
introduction of the concept of "unreasonably dangerous per se." A
closer reading shows that the standards for a finding of "unreasonably
dangerous to normal use" have been changed from the balancing process
to a relative test, or a test by comparison of the product in question
with other products on the market.
The words themselves of the Halphen opinion portray the "per se"
category simply as a streamlined mode of trial that precludes introduction
of evidence of knowledge or reasonable development of the products.
While there is no language in the opinion to support the view, it has
been speculated that the category is reserved for super-dangerous products, so that unreasonably dangerous per se describes a high degree of
dangerousness, and, eventually, various products could be classified as
such and become irrevocably a member of this deplorable species. The
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Brown v. Sears Roebuck
& Co." did exactly that. The supreme court granted writs, but the
opinion as of this writing has not been handed down, and we must
await what may be an explanation of the per se category.
As the opinion in Halphen points out, the scheme of products
liability therein adopted was announced principally by Professor W.
Page Keeton of the University of Texas Law School, set forth ini his
law review articles and perpetuated in the Prosser and Keeton hornbook
on torts.16 There is thus little jurisprudence, in fact none, to furnish
guidance in this analytical structure. Louisiana is the pioneer, and in
truth our source of guidance is no more than the very fully written
Halphen opinion itself.
Toups v. Sears Roebuck & Co.3 7 is the most significant case as of
this writing to come from the supreme court under the Halphen structure.
The presence of Halphen in our jurisprudence made little difference in
the Toups opinion itself, which is more remarkable as an example of
appellate review of fact than as an analysis of liability based on a failure
to warn.
The Toups court found that Sears was liable for the burns inflicted
upon a young boy who suffered his injuries when a flame burst upon
him in a shed containing both the hot water heater and a can of gasoline

34.
35.
36.
37.

Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
503 So. 2d 1122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 99 at 699, n.31 (5th ed. 1984).
507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1987).
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stored nearby. Although the jury and the court of appeal had found
in favor of the defendant, the supreme court pointed out errors in the
instructions to the jury and in the failure to admit evidence as to
subsequent warnings, and then gave judgment from the bench for the
plaintiff and remanded to the court of appeal to fix damages. It is
implicit in the rendering of judgment from the bench that the court
was of the opinion that the jury could not have found other than for
the plaintiff, under the evidence properly admitted and under charges
properly given. In other words, it would have been error for the trial
court to refuse a directed verdict for the plaintiff, or, at the close of
the entire trial, it would have been similar error to refuse a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
It is doubtful that the application of traditional standards for the
granting of directed verdicts or motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict 3" would have resulted in judgment for plaintiff in the Toups
case under the evidence portrayed in the opinion. A jury within its
province certainly could have found that even without the subsequent
warning, there had been no compelling showing to them that a hot
water heater is unreasonably dangerous because its pilot flame ignites
the vapors from a can of gasoline stored nearby; or it could have found
that even with another warning, the accident still would have occurred.
At the heart of the Toups opinion is the presumption that if a
proper warning had been given, it would have been read and heeded,
and the accident thus avoided. Bloxom v. Bloxom,3 9 rendered on September 9, 1987, shows that this presumption is rebuttable when "an
adequate warning or instruction would have been futile under the circumstances."
Civil Code Articles 667-669
The Civil Code provides in article 667 that one should not cause
damage to neighboring property. The courts have held a proprietor
strictly liable under this article for damage inflicted upon a neighbor
40
only when the activity causing the damage was ultrahazardous in nature.
The breach of the duty imposed by article 667 constitutes fault, cognizable under article 2315, which in turn requires that an obligation be
imposed to repair the harm.4 1 If the harm can be classified as an
inconvenience, rather than damage, then Civil Code article 668 provides
that it is not actionable.

38.
39.
40.
41.

La. Code Civ. P. art. 1811.
No. 86-2108, slip op. (La. Sept. 9, 1987).
4 A. Yiannopoulas, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 50, at 141.
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
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1. Land-Based Activity Required Under Article 667
While article 667 imposes liability for harm caused by.an ultrahazardous activity, the courts have made it clear that an ultrahazardous
activity separate and apart from land is not a source of strict liability
in Louisiana.4 2 This refinement of our tort doctrine was brought clearly
into focus when, in two recent cases, liability for the providing of
handguns was sought to be based upon strict liability for an ultrahazardous activity (the indiscriminate distribution of the guns)."3 The courts
held that in Louisiana, ultrahazardous activities must be land-connected
to give rise to strict liability.
2. Proprietor'sDuty is Non-Delegable Under Article 667
Liability under article 667 for ultrahazardous activity appears to be
grounded in the defendant's ownership of the property on which the
activity was done. Therefore the proprietor may not interpose his independent contractor to escape liability for the harm caused to a neighbor
by the independent contractor's activity; i.e., the duty of the proprietor
is non-delegable." While there is some language to the contrary, the
majority of the cases do not apply article 667 to the independent
contractor himself, since he is not a proprietor. Also the standard of
care applicable to the contractor is drawn from the rules governing the
activity in which the contractor was engaged at the time he inflicted
45
the harm.
3.

Contributory Negligence is Inapplicable Under Article 667

The Louisiana Supreme Court has clearly excluded contributory
negligence as a defense to article 667 liability." It has with equal clarity
recognized assumption of risk as a valid defense.4 7 It can be reasoned
that the liability under article 667 is a form of enterprise liability and,
hence, different in kind from the strict liability of Loescher or WeberHalphen. Therefore, it would seem inappropriate to change the rule of
non-applicability as to contributory negligence on the grounds that the
advent of comparative negligence should render contributory negligence
no longer an absolute bar. Indeed, the present language of Civil Code
article 2323, invoking comparative negligence "when contributory neg-

42.
499 So.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Strickland v. Fowler,
2d 199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
Id.
Yiannopoulas, supra note 38, § 46.
Id.
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
Id.
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ligence is applicable," seems to be precisely tailored to fit the article
667 action, in which contributory negligence is not applicable. The
excellent analysis of the relative degree of reprehensibility of activity set
forth by Judge Federoff in Dorry v. Lafleur48 bolsters this reasoning,
and Dorry may, in fact, be a complete set of reasons to reach this
conclusion.
4.

Nuisance Under Article 669

When the harm caused is to non-neighboring property, the provisions
of Civil Code article 669 may be invoked.4 9 There is no requirement
that an ultrahazardous activity be found, and the article is used to
provide in Louisiana the relief that is founded upon the common-law
action of nuisance in other jurisdictions.

48.
49.

399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981).
Yiannopoulas, supra note 38, §§ 53-65.

